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So I guess now the real business can begin. Having spent the past 42 
months in limbo (part one), we now take a bold and significant, if not 
wholly convincing, stride into limbo (part two). This on the back of 
failed and broken promises and a Brexiteer contingent who seem 
taken aback with the audacity of the EU that they might in future 
relationship discussions prioritise the interests of member states over 
those of the UK. 
The past few months have given plenty for the commentary industry 
to posit. This includes myself, as in previous blogs I have fixated on 
the failings of the UK’s social liberal contingent. Much philosophising 
has occurred on the back of the fall of the so-called Red Wall in 
December. Now the politics is done for at least the foreseeable future, 
it seems pertinent to focus on more practical issues of the potential 
outcome for these places. 
Enduring problems seen in the secondary centres of England’s 
Midlands and North have become the cause celebre of the past three 
years. Cast as the ‘places that don’t matter’ exacting a brutal revenge 
on the institutions successively failing them[i], the plight of such 
places has even seen the emergence of a specialist thinktank – the 
Centre for Towns[ii] – to counteract the monopoly of cities and their 
associated agglomeration benefits in policy discourse. The fact that 
these secondary centres were amongst those most at risk of decline 
in the event of leaving the EU is not without irony[iii]. 
The risk posed to industry in such places – and thus to communities 
themselves – is not solely about input-output relations or global just-
in-time supply chains. It is instead indicative of a more complex 
relationship emerging as local economies are reconfigured through 
forces of liberalised trade, laissez faire government, highly 
constrained local intervention capacity, and broader industrial 
restructuring. 
One way of thinking about local economies is as a set of 
assemblages. Assemblage thinking focuses on the interaction of 
actors and materialities. What we identify as ‘local’ is inevitably a more 
complex set of transactions involving strategic and operational 
decisions taken at varying levels but manifesting at a localised point. 
The location of a new factory in a locality illustrates such a dynamic, 
involving national and local level planning regulation, local level 
feasibility analysis, and remote investment decisions. 
Whilst assemblages can be highly complex, one way of simplifying 
them is classifying actors as from one of a core set of participants. 
These are the state in the shape of governmental institutions, the 
market through competing business and private investment interests, 
and civil society representing communitarian and citizen concerns. 
It is in this union that failings embedded in England’s secondary 
centres can more effectively be exposed. Addressing a range of civic 
concerns within such places is hugely dependent on the actions of 
state and market. The legacy of successive governments focusing on 
city-based methods as a quick win economic intervention has 
however reconfigured the local dynamics between these actors. 
Sub-national governance arrangements have here moved further 
toward city-based models, with the introduction of first Local 
Enterprise Partnerships, the city deals, and more recently Combined 
Authorities. The conduit for local level autonomy and greater 
investment pots has thus occurred through closer alignment with 
regional centres rather than responding to localised concerns. At the 
same time, the ability of such dynamics to accommodate the core 
needs of traditional industries in ‘secular decline’ (to use the 
government’s own words) and with fragmenting transactional patterns 
has been limited. 
The result has seen a continuing separation of local state and market. 
Local government organisations have been constrained by 100 years 
of centralisation and a decade of austerity from effective interaction 
and engagement with their business communities. And certainly the 
more traditional form of industry embedded within local imaginations. 
Perhaps more insidious however is the processes through which both 
state and market essentially decouple themselves from their locality. 
In the case of state organisations, this is driven through reformed 
governance arrangements, bound into city-based objectives offering 
access to resource and investment as part of an aggregated 
geography. The fait accompli here for secondary places is alignment 
with an agenda maintaining the primacy of cities as the sole route to 
sponsorship in a time of resource scarcity. 
For market actors, forsaken by the state, the option is an evolving 
model of practice which links the ongoing renewal of production 
networks with greater integration into the ‘non-local’; that is, the 
escalation of relations beyond and slow reduction of dependence on 
the local. This has inevitable consequences, resituating firm-based 
investment at a time when state-based investment is similarly 
forthcoming. 
What this means is the outlook for such places is fairly bleak. 
Exhibiting a relatively sluggish recovery post-2008[iv], the input-output 
challenges of any sort of Brexit already work against their interests. 
The ongoing separation – and decoupling – of industry and 
governance from secondary centres suggests not only limited 
capability to address issues of continuing decline but also limited 
incentive, as organisation survival concerns are best represented 
through ongoing decoupling. 
Such problems pre-date Brexit, and will not be eradicated by any 
outcome regardless bravado of the current administration. One 
resolution may be further reconfiguration of sub-national units to 
recreate the local, cogniscant of recent restructuring. It is unlikely this 
will sit well with local imaginations along the former Red Wall. 
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